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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #2A-5/13/83 
SUFFOLK REGIONAL OFF-TRACK 
BETTING CORPORATION. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2503 
LOCAL 237 TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On August 19. 1982. Local 237 Teamsters (petitioner) 
filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the 
Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition for 
certification as the exclusive negotiating representative 
of certain employees of the Suffolk Regional Off-Track 
Betting Corporation. 
The parties executed a consent agreement wherein they 
stipulated that the negotiating unit would be as follows: 
Included: Managers. assistant managers, 
line supervisors and tel-a-bet 
supervisors. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Pursuant to the consent agreement and in order for the 
petitioner to demonstrate its majority status, a secret 
ballot election was held on April 27, 1983. The results of 
Board - C-2503 
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the election establish that a majority of eligible voters 
in the stipulated unit do not•desire to be represented by 
. . 1/ the petitioner.— 
THEREFORE. IT IS ORDERED that the petition be. and it 
hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: May 13. 198 3 
Albany. New York 
1/ Of the 72 ballots cast, 4 were challenged. 30 were for 
and 38 against representation by the petitioner. The 
challenged ballots were not sufficient in number to 
affect the results of the election. 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
&o £%• /<£4-
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF SOUTHHAMPTON. 
Respondent, 
-and-
SOUTHHAMPTON VILLAGE POLICE RADIO 
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION. 
Applicant. 
SCHEINBERG. DePETRIS & PRUZANSKY. ESQS. (RICHARD E. 
DePETRIS. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Respondent 
SCHLACHTER & MAURO, ESQ. (REYNOLD A. MAURO, ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Applicant 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Southhampton Village Police Radio Operators Association 
(Association) to a determination by the Director of 
Conciliation (Director) that the Village Radio Operators are 
not employed as policemen by the Village of Southhampton 
(Village) and. therefore, are not covered by the compulsory 
interest arbitration procedures of the Taylor Law. 
The Association filed an application for interest 
arbitration on behalf of the radio operators and the Village 
opposed the application on the ground that the radio 
operators are not covered by the interest arbitration 
T3S" QifW f 4S 
#2B-5/13/83 
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provisions of the Taylor Law (§209.4). That section provides 
for interest arbitration to resolve impasses in collective 
negotiation disputes involving "officers or members of any-
organized fire department, police force or police 
department . . . ." The question before us is whether the 
radio operators are "officers or members" of the police force 
or police department of the Village. On the basis of 
information and memoranda of law submitted by the parties, 
the Director determined that they are not. 
The Association argues that the Director's determination 
was in error. Apparently dissatisfied with the accuracy of 
the information contained in some of the documents submitted 
to the Director which was the basis for his decision, it also 
requests "a full record hearing." 
After the exceptions were received, the parties were 
informed as to which documents were determined to constitute 
the record and they were invited to brief both the question 
whether the record, as designated, is satisfactory and the 
substantive merits of the Director's decision. The Village 
submitted a brief in which it stated that the record is 
satisfactory and that it supported the Director's decision. 
The Association's response was directed to the merits of the 
Director's decision only. Accordingly, we determine that the 
record, as designated, was adequate and no hearing is 
required. 
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Having reviewed the record, we affirm the decision of 
the Director that the radio operators are not "officers or 
members" of the police force or police department of the 
Village. The Village did not hire them to work as police 
officers and they do not meet the minimum qualifications for 
Village policemen as set forth in General Municipal Law 
§209-q and Civil Service Law §58.— While the radio 
operators have been deputized by the Suffolk County Sheriff, 
and may therefore be peace officers of the County, the 
Sheriff's action does not alter the radio operators' 
employment relationship with the Village. We find that they 
are and remain civilian employees of the Village. 
In Village of Potsdam. 16 PERB 1[3032 (1983). we held 
that civilian employees and police employees of a police 
department are subject to different impasse procedures, the 
interest arbitration procedures of §209.4 being applicable to 
police employees only. The Director properly found that 
decision to preclude his granting the Association's 
application, and we affirm his ruling. 
i^The Taylor Law language "officer or member of an 
organized police force or department . . . " appears to 
parallel §302.11.c of the Retirement and Social Security 
Law. The radio operators are not members of the State 
Police and Firemen's Retirement System, which covers 
officers and members in the police or fire service. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the exceptions herein be, 
and they hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: May 13. 1983 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/fc&M-CL 
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. 
//2D-5/13/83 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-5764 
DONALD J. BARNETT. 
Charging Party, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS. 
Intervenor. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
This matter comes to us on a motion made by Donald J. 
Barnett for an extension of time during which to file 
exceptions to a hearing officer's decision dismissing his 
charge. The motion is made under §204.12 of our Rules of 
Procedure which permits an extension, even absent a timely 
request, "because of extraordinary circumstances".— 
A/A request for an extension would have been timely 
within the Rule had it been filed not later than March 15. 
1983. Barnett did not do so. but requested an extension on 
March 17, 1983. 
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In support of his motion, Barnett asserts that he did 
not make a timely request for an extension because he has 
been incapacitated since February 25, 1983 by reason of an 
in-service injury. 
We are not persuaded from his papers or from the record 
of other proceedings he has brought before us that Barnett 
was prevented by physical incapacity or other extraordinary 
circumstances from making a timely request. 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the motion herein be. and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: May 13, 1983 
Albany. New York 
•#kzi&& f£l GA.QTM&*^^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Ida Klaus. Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2E-5/13/83 
In the Matter of 
WYANDANCH TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. Case No. D-0187 
Upon the Charge of Violation of 
Section 210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
This matter comes to us on a motion dated March 21, 
1983, made by the Wyandanch Teachers Association 
(Association). It moves this Board for an order rescinding 
the order that this Board previously issued in this matter 
on October 28, 1982 (15 PERB ir3109). which directed the 
forfeiture of its dues deduction and agency shop fee 
privileges. The forfeiture was imposed as a penalty 
because the Association engaged in an illegal 41-day strike 
against the Wyandanch Union Free School District 
(District)— from September 17 through November 16, 1979. 
I/The District has filed a response to the motion in 
which it states that "neither legal nor factual showing has 
been made as to entitle the union to the relief requested." 
. H9ft 
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In support of its motion, the Association has 
submitted two affidavits in which it affirms that it does 
not assert the right to strike against any government or to 
assist or participate in such a strike. One of the 
affidavits also states that the Association has done "all 
that is humanly possible to attempt to collect dues from 
the Wyandanch Teachers. . .", but no basis for this 
2/ 
conclusory statement is specified in the affidavits.— 
The motion papers allege that the Association 
collected $3,435.22 of the $15,056.30 (a 77% falloff) of 
the dues it normally would have collected between November 
19, 1982, the date on which the forfeiture directive was 
issued, and February 28, 1983. There is no support for 
this allegation in the affidavits. Moreover, there is no 
statement of an audit showing the financial status of the 
Association and its ability to absorb the loss of dues 
income. 
Neither the affidavits nor the motion papers contain 
information regarding the present financial ability of the 
Association to provide representational services to its 
unit employees. Rather, they deal with activities that are 
2/The motion itself does contain unsworn allegations 
of specific efforts made by the Association to collect its 
dues from its members. 
+ 828f 
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not directly related to the statutory obligation of an 
employee organization to negotiate collectively and to 
represent its unit employees in grievances. 
Relief from a dues checkoff forfeiture is not granted 
unless the effect of that forfeiture has been shown to have 
substantially impaired the employee organization's ability 
3/ to provide representational service.— 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the motion herein be. and 
it hereby is. denied. 
DATED: May 13. 1983 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. Randies. Member 
2/see Amalgamated Transit Union. AFL-CIO, Local 726. 
16 PERB 1f302l. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In t h e Matter of #2F-5/13/83 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2. 
NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-5803 
DONALD J. BARNETT. 
Charging Party. 
JAMES. R. SANDNER, ESQ., (RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, ESQ.. 
) of Counsel), for Respondent 
DONALD J. BARNETT, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of both 
Donald J. Barnett, the charging party, and United Federation 
of Teachers, Local 2, NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO. the respondent, to 
a hearing officer's decision. The hearing officer found that 
respondent provided the benefits of an accidental death and 
dismemberment policy to its members only, even though the 
premiums were paid out of funds of the respondent which 
i 
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include agency shop fee payments. He directed respondent to 
reimburse Barnett for the per-member costs of the insurance 
he paid during the four months before the filing of the 
charge. The hearing officer dismissed a second specification 
of the charge which alleged a violation in that respondent 
coerced agency shop fee payers into joining by stating that 
the insurance benefits were not available to nonmembers. 
Barnett's exceptions complain that the hearing officer 
erred in dismissing the second specification of his charge. 
He also complains that the hearing officer erred in issuing 
an inadequate remedial order. In particular, he argues that 
the hearing officer should have directed respondent to refund 
to him. and to others paying an agency shop fee to 
respondent, their per-member costs of the insurance since 
January 1980, the effective date of our order in UUP (Eson). 
12 PERB ir3117 (1979). aff'd UUP v. Newman. 80 AD2d 23 (3d 
Dept.. 1981). 14 PERB T7011. lv. to app. den. 54 NY2d 611 
(1981). 14 PERB T7026 (1981) 
Respondent's cross-exceptions relate to the hearing 
officer's processing of the case. In particular, it 
complains that the hearing officer erred in relying upon the 
record in UUP (Eson). supra and in denying it a hearing, and 
that the hearing officer erred in not dismissing Barnett's 
Board - U-5803 -3 
charge as being barred by res judicata.— 
In UUP (Eson). we found that United University 
Professions. Inc. (UUP) violated §209-a.2(a) of the Taylor 
Law in that it charged agency shop fee payers for insurance 
coverage that was not provided to them. We ordered it to 
provide the insurance benefits to the agency shop fee payers 
or. in the alternative, to cease collecting the per-member 
costs of the insurance benefits from them. That order became 
effective in January 1980. 
In that case, the insurance coverage involved was 
provided pursuant to a policy owned by the New York State 
United Teachers (NYSUT), a state organization with which UUP 
was affiliated. The insurance benefits which Barnett 
complains about herein are the same as those dealt with in 
I/Barnett requested an extension of time in which to 
file a reply to respondent's cross-exceptions after the 
time in which to make such a request had passed. It was 
denied. He now moves for permission to make a late request 
on the ground that extraordinary circumstances prevented 
him from making a timely request. (See our Rules of 
Procedure §204.12.) In support of his motion, he has 
submitted evidence of an injury incurred on the day after 
respondent filed its cross-exceptions. There is no 
indication, however, that the injury disabled Barnett from 
writing a letter requesting an extension of time in which 
to file a reply. On the contrary, Barnett made a timely 
request for an extension and it was granted. He was late 
when he wrote for a further extension. 
We find no evidence of extraordinary circumstances ,as 
would justify granting the motion herein, and we deny it. 
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UUP (Eson) and are furnished by respondent under the same 
NYSUT-owned policy. 
Barnett argues that our order in UUP (Eson) is binding 
on all agency shop fee payers denied benefits under the NYSUT 
insurance policy. This would include not only UUP's agency 
shop fee payers, but also respondent's agency shop fee payers 
and, presumably, those in all NYSUT affiliates. 
This argument is rejected on procedural and substantive 
grounds. The charge in the earlier case was brought against 
UUP; respondent was not a party. Barnett's charge was 
brought against respondent; UUP is not a party. NYSUT, which 
is the owner of the insurance policy, has not been a party in 
either case. The record in the instant case indicates that 
there may have been a difference in the time of coverage of 
agency shop fee payers in UUP's and respondent's units. 
Barnett also takes exception to the hearing officer's 
failure to issue a cease and desist or posting order. The 
hearing officer did not issue the cease and desist order 
because he found that respondent had already come into 
compliance. He did not issue a posting order because he 
found that respondent had made its compliance known to unit 
employees. 
We find that the hearing officer's remedy for 
respondent's violation as alleged in the first specification 
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of the charge was reasonable. The hearing officer dismissed 
Barnett's second specification on the ground that the 
information disseminated, that agency shop fee payers were 
not receiving the insurance benefits, was correct. The 
hearing officer correctly concluded that the second 
specification was subsumed under the first specification of 
the charge. 
Turning to respondent's exceptions, it asserts that it 
was denied an opportunity to prove that, notwithstanding the 
conduct of UUP and NYSUT in UUP (Eson). its agency shop fee 
payers were eligible for the insurance benefits from the 
inception of the program. The hearing officer requested an 
offer of proof from respondent to show that its agency shop 
fee payers were treated differently from UUP agency shop fee 
payers under the identical NYSUT policy. There was evidence 
that the premiums were raised on October 1, 1981. because of 
the additional coverage of respondent's agency shop fee 
payers, and this was noted by the hearing officer. With 
respect to the period before October 1, 1981, however, 
respondent offered only to introduce evidence of unsupported 
statements that it had been the policy of NYSUT to provide 
coverage for agency shop fee payers. The hearing officer 
determined that such testimony would not be persuasive and 
did not hold a hearing. 
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Notwithstanding this exception, respondent states that 
it does not want a hearing at this time because the cost of 
participating in the hearing would exceed its obligations 
under the order recommended by the hearing officer. 
Accordingly, we treat this exception as moot. 
In support of its res judicata argument, respondent 
refers to UFT (Barnett). 15 PERB 1P103 (1982). It. like the 
instant case, involved an insurance plan provided by 
respondent. Barnett complains in both charges that 
respondent denied coverage to agency shop fee payers and that 
plan descriptions made by respondent coerced unit employees 
into joining it. The guestion raised by this exception is 
whether Barnett split his cause of action by making two 
separate charges. The hearing officer determined that he did 
not because there were two separate causes of action, each 
dealing with a separate insurance policy. While we find that 
Barnett could have combined the two charges and that it would 
have been better practice if he had done so. we agree with 
the hearing officer that his failure to do so did not 
preclude the bringing of the charge herein. 
Finally, we note that both Barnett and UFT ask this 
Board to award them costs. We find no basis for doing so and 
deny both reguests. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER respondent to pay Barnett a sum 
egual to the per-member cost of the 
,- 8288 
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insurance coverage from August 10. 1981 
until the date when unit members paying 
an agency shop fee to respondent were 
actually covered by the insurance policy 
with interest at nine percent per annum. 
WE FURTHER ORDER that in all other respects the charge 
herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 13, 19 8 3 
Albany, New York 
^i^e^/l 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
,3ftfc tfjUM*^-
Ida Klaus, Member 
'*x«H 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
//2G-5/13/83 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY 
OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY). 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-3221/U-3777 
THE CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION. INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and-
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION. 
Intervener. 
JOSEPH BRESS. ESQ. (WILLIAM COLLINS. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH. ESQS., (MARJORIE E. 
KAROWE, ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
JAMES R. SANDNER. ESQ. (SUSAN JONES, ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On July 15, 1980, we issued a decision dismissing 
charges of the Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) and 
the Public Employees Federation (PEF). 13 PERB ir3044.~ 
alleging that the State of New York (State University of 
I/The charges were originally filed by CSEA. Subsequent 
to the filing of the charges. PEF replaced CSEA in one of the 
negotiating units affected by the alleged improper practices. 
It was then permitted to intervene in support of the charges. 
29# 
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New York at Albany) improperly directed employees to absent 
themselves from work on the day following Thanksgiving Day in 
1976. 1977 and 1978, and to charge such absences to 
2/ 
accumulated leave credits or absence without pay.— 
The basis for our decision was that the State had not 
acted without prior negotiations in that CSEA had made a 
relevant proposal during negotiations for the agreement 
covering the 1976-77 school year, and then had dropped it. 
We ruled that by failing to press its proposal. CSEA had 
waived its right to protest the State's action as to the day 
after Thanksgiving Day in the year covered by the 1976-77 
3/ 
contract.— We also found that the State's past action and 
announced intention to do the same in 1977 imposed a burden 
upon CSEA to raise the issue of pay for the day after 
Thanksgiving Day in its negotiations for the 1977-79 
agreement and that its failure to do so constituted a waiver 
of its right to protest the State's action in the two years 
covered by that agreement. 
i-^ Three separate charges complained about this conduct. 
U-2462 was directed to 1976. U-3221 to 1977 and U-3777 to 1978. 
I-/CSEA had not filed an improper practice charge when 
the State had taken similar action in 1975, but had relied 
upon a contract grievance. That grievance was decided against 
CSEA by an arbitrator and we found CSEA's decision to drop its 
negotiation proposal all the more evidence of a waiver in the 
light of the prior arbitration award. 
Board - U-3221 & U-3777 
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Our decision was appealed to the Appellate Division, 
Third Department, which issued its decision on May 6, 1982. 
CSEA V. Newman, 88 AD2d 685 (3d Dept.. 1982), 15 PERB T7011; 
appeal dismissed 57 NY2d 775 (1982). 15 PERB T7020. It 
affirmed the holding of this Board that CSEA's failure to 
press its negotiation proposal for the 1976-77 agreement 
constituted a waiver of its right to complain about the 
State's action in that year. Reversing this Board, however, 
it determined that CSEA did not waive its right to protest 
the State's actions during the two years covered by the 
I, 
succeeding contract by failing to make a relevant demand 
4/ during those particular negotiations.— Accordingly, it 
remanded to us charges U-3221 and U-3777 to consider the 
other issues raised by them. 
Pursuant to the order of the Appellate Division, we now 
consider the merits of the charges and defenses in U-3221 and 
U-3777. The allegation that the State directed unit 
employees not to report to work on the day following 
Thanksgiving Day in 1977 and 1978 and to charge those days to 
4/The Court said that there was "no evidence of an 
explicit, unmistakable, unambiguous waiver of CSEA's right to 
negotiate. CSEA's failure to demand negotiations may have 
been inexplicable, but it should not be construed as a waiver". 
„ .829R 
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their accumulated leave credits, if any, or, in the absence 
of such leave credits, to leave without pay is conceded. 
However, the State raises four defenses for its conduct. 
It notes that it first took the action complained of in 
1975 and asserts that the impropriety, if any, occurred in 
that year. Thus, according to the State, the charges 
complain about conduct that occurred more than four months 
prior to the time they were filed, and are therefore not 
timely. In rejecting this argument, the hearing officer 
found that the State determined on an annual basis whether 
the employees should or should not be directed to report to 
work on the day after Thanksgiving Day. "Thus, the improper 
practices, if any, occurred on each occasion that the State 
implemented its annual decision." We affirm this 
determination of the hearing officer for the reasons stated 
by him. 
The State's second defense is that it was exercising a 
management prerogative when it directed unit employees not to 
report to work on the day after Thanksgiving Day and to 
charge the absence to accumulated leave or to take leave 
without pay. We have already affirmed the decision of the 
hearing officer dismissing this defense. In our prior 
decision we held that while a public employer may direct 
employees not to come to work, it may not unilaterally decide 
that employees shall lose pay for the days of such 
• 82m 
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5/ absence.— 
The State's third defense is that CSEA waived its right 
to negotiate the impact of the layoffs upon the compensation 
of the unit employees. In part this argument is based upon 
CSEA's failure to make a negotiation demand. To that extent, 
the decision of the Appellate Division is binding upon us as 
6 / 
the rule of this case.— In part this argument is also 
based upon an alleged contractual right which, the State 
asserts, was established by several arbitration awards 
upholding its conduct under its various contracts with CSEA. 
The collective bargaining agreements between the State and 
5/in Vestal CSD. 15 PERB ir3006 (1982), we distinguished 
temporary layoffs because of a significant diminution of the 
amount of work available from layoffs such as those that 
occurred in the instant cases where there is no indication in 
the record of a diminution of the work to be performed. The 
action of a public employer compelling employees to perform 
the same amount of work as before in less time and therefore 
with less compensation constitutes an improper practice. 
Oswego City School District. 5 PERB 1P011 (1972). aff'd. City 
School District of Oswego v. Helsby. 42 AD2d 262, (3d Dept.. 
1973). 6 PERB T7008. 
ij/we attempted to challenge the decision of the 
Appellate Division with respect to Cases U-3221 and U-3777 by 
seeking review by the Court of Appeals, but our notice of 
appeal was dismissed, "upon the ground that the order appealed 
from does not finally determine the proceeding within the 
meaning of the Constitution." CSEA v. Newman. 57 NY2d 775 
(1982). 15 PERB 1[7020. We therefore did not test the holding 
of the Appellate Division that, under the circumstances 
herein. CSEA's failure to make a demand did not constitute an 
unmistakable waiver, just as its failure to press its demand 
for its 1976 agreement did. We intend to raise the issue" of 
unexpressed waiver before the Court of Appeals in the 
appropriate case at an appropriate opportunity in the future. 
'£=<« 
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CSEA did not authorize the State to direct employees to take 
absences without pay or with charges to accruals. According 
to the hearing officer, the arbitration awards add little to 
the State's argument in this regard in that they merely hold 
that nothing in the parties' collective bargaining agreements 
7/ prevented the State from taking the action it did.— We 
affirm this determination of the hearing officer. 
Finally, the State argues that its action requiring unit 
employees to take leave which would be charged to accruals or 
would be without pay did not constitute a unilateral change 
because it did not constitute a change at all. The State 
points to occasions where, because of special conditions such 
as weather emergencies, plant breakdowns and evacuations in 
the face of emergencies such as bomb threats, it directed 
employees not to report to work and to charge the absence to 
their accruals. We find that the action of the State in 
dismissing or excusing employees from work during the course 
of a temporary emergency and not paying them for the time 
missed does not support its action herein. Here it made a 
deliberate, advance decision that employees should not work 
on a day on which in previous years they had been paid for 
performing a relatively light workload. 
Z/We reached the same conclusion at 11 PERB 1P026 (1978) 
with respect to the first of the arbitration awards. 
289" 
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Having again considered the record evidence and heard 
the arguments of the parties, we determine that the conduct 
of the State constitutes improper unilateral action in 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. This leaves us 
with the question of what the appropriate remedy is for that 
violation. The hearing officer recommended that the State be 
ordered "to cease and desist from directing its employees not 
to report to work and to charge their absence to leave 
without pay or to accrued leave credits." He recommended, at 
12 PERB ir4606 (1979). however, that the State not be ordered 
to make the employees whole for the charges to their leave 
credits or their loss of pay because in past years many 
employees had taken vacations voluntarily, and it was not 
possible to determine "which employees would have worked on 
the days in question were it not for the State's order." 
CSEA and PEF have filed exceptions to the decision of 
the hearing officer which complain that he should have 
granted affirmative relief to the employees who were directed 
not to work on the day after Thanksgiving Day. They contend 
that all employees who were directed not to come to work on 
the Friday following Thanksgiving Day. and who had not 
previously requested the day off. should be credited for that 
day if they worked on the previous Wednesday and the 
following Monday. In support of this proposition, they argue 
that the hearing officer engaged in irrelevant speculation 
Board - U-3221 & U-3777 
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when he concluded that some of the employees who were 
prevented from working might have chosen not to work. 
According to CSEA and PEF, the State had the burden of 
proving that specific employees were not entitled to 
compensation for the Friday following Thanksgiving Day and it 
did not meet that burden. 
We find merit in the position of CSEA and PEF. The unit 
employees at the State University were prevented from earning 
their wages on the day after Thanksgiving Day in both 1977 
and 1978 by reason of the State's improper practices. While 
the State asserts that some of the employees might, in any 
event, have chosen not to come to work on those days, its 
assertion is based on speculative claims and the State 
neither identifies any such individuals nor offers any 
reasonable basis for identifying them. CSEA and PEF concede 
that it would be reasonable to conclude that employees who 
had requested the day off before the State's improper conduct 
or who did not come to work on the Wednesday before or the 
Monday following Thanksgiving Day, would have taken the 
Friday off. We agree with these organizations that it would 
be unreasonable to reach the same conclusion with respect to 
the other employees. There is consequently no basis in the 
record for denying relief to all other individuals who were 
not permitted to work on those days. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER the State to: 
1. cease and desist from unilaterally requiring unit 
. 8391 
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employees to absent themselves from work on the day 
after Thanksgiving Day and from charging those 
absences to accumulated leave or to forego the wages 
that would have been earned but for such absences, 
reimburse unit employees at the State University of 
New York at Albany who were required to take leave 
without pay on the day following Thanksgiving Day in 
1977 and 1978, who had not previously requested the 
day off. and who had worked on the previous 
Wednesday and the following Monday their wages lost 
on those days plus interest at three percent per 
annum until April 1. 1983 and nine percent per annum 
thereafter, and 
restore to unit employees at the State University of 
New York at Albany who were required to charge to 
accumulated leave absences that they were required 
to take on the day following Thanksgiving Day in 
1977 and 1978, who had not previously requested the 
day off, and who had worked on the previous 
Wednesday and the following Monday, their 
accumulated leave so charged, and 
reimburse former unit employees at the State 
University of New York at Albany who were required 
to take leave without pay on the day following 
Thanksgiving Day in 1977 or 1978. or to charge their 
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absences on those days to accumulated leave, who had 
not previously requested the day off, and who had 
worked on the previous Wednesday and the following 
Monday at their daily rate of pay for such days plus 
interest at three percent per annum until April 1, 
1983 and aine percent per annum thereafter, and 
post the attached notice at all work locations 
normally used to communicate with unit employees at 
the State University of New York at Albany. 
DATED: May 13. 1983 
Albany. New York 
Harold RTNewman. Chairman 
g%0u /CKt /*4f4^ 
Ida., K l a u s , Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
- and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 a n u n i t employess of the State University of New York 
at Albany that: 
1. we will not unilaterally require unit employees to absent 
themselves from work on the day after Thanksgiving Day and from 
charging those absences to accumulated leave or to forego the 
wages that would have been earned but for such absences. 
2. we will reimburse unit employees at the State University of New 
York at Albany who were required to take leave without pay on 
the day following Thanksgiving Day in 1977 and 1978, who had not 
previously requested the day off. and who had worked on the 
previous Wednesday and the following Monday their wages lost on 
those days plus interest at three percent per annum until April 
1, 1983 and nine percent per annum thereafter, and 
3. we will restore to unit employees at the State University of New 
York at Albany who were required to charge to accumulated leave 
absences that they were required to take on the day following 
Thanksgiving Day in 1977 and 1978, who had not previously 
requested the day off, and who had worked on the previous 
Wednesday and the following Monday, their accumulated leave so 
charged, and -
4. we will reimburse former unit employees at the State University 
of New York at Albany who were required to take leave without 
pay on. the day following Thanksgiving Day in 1977 or 1978, or to 
charge their absences on those days to accumulated leave, who 
had not previously requested the day off, and who had worked on 
the previous Wednesday and the following Monday at their daily 
rate of pay for such days plus interest at three percent per 
annum until April 1, 1983 and nine percent per annum thereafter. 
State University of New York at Albany 
Dated ' By. 
(Representative) (Title) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #2H-5/13/83 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. 
Respondent. 
- and -
CASE NO. U-6129 
FRED GREENBERG, 
Charging Party. 
THOMAS A. LIESE, ESQ.. for Respondent 
FRED GREENBERG. pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Fred 
Greenberg to a hearing officer's decision dismissing his charge 
that the Board of Education of the City School District of the 
City of New York (District) acted improperly when, in violation 
of its own bylaws, it permitted employees trained by the United 
Federation of Teachers (UFT) to represent fellow employees in 
more than two unsatisfactory rating reviews (105A hearings) per 
year and to be compensated by UFT for such service. Employees 
other than those trained by UFT were held to the bylaw 
provisions restricting them to two appearances a year without 
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compensation.— 
This case is related to an earlier one. UFT (Barnett). 14 
PERB 1P017 (1981). We held then that UFT acted improperly by 
providing trained representatives in 105A hearings to its 
members but not to nonmembers. The instant charge, which is 
against the District rather than UFT. complains about 
discrimination in the treatment of representatives rather than 
in the treatment of those being represented. Moreover, the 
hearing officer noted that there was no discrimination in the 
treatment of those being represented in that both UFT members 
and nonmembers were confronted with the same choice: they 
could be represented by UFT-trained. regular, compensated 
representatives or by non-UFT trained, irregular, 
noncompensated representatives. 
The hearing officer found that the District did accord 
preferred treatment to UFT trained representatives. She 
concluded, however, that this preferred treatment was not 
1/Greenberg requested an opportunity to file a reply to 
the District's response to his exceptions. He was informed 
that the Rules of this Board do not provide for replies but 
that we accept and consider them when they arrive early enough 
so they do not delay the processing of exceptions. This did 
not satisfy Greenberg. who had asked for three weeks time in 
which to file a reply, and he renewed his request. Greenberg 
was granted several extensions of time in which to file his 
original exceptions, and the District's response does not raise 
any new issues. We. therefore, deny Greenberg's request and 
decide this matter on the record and the argument already 
before us. 
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improper because: 
UFT is the exclusive bargaining representative of 
the unit in which charging party is a member. As 
such. UFT has the right to exclusivity regarding 
matters affecting the employment relationship, 
including representation of unit employees at 
105A hearings. 
She also concluded that the fact that the distinction violated 
the District bylaws is irrelevant. She reasoned that as the 
right to a hearing and its procedures is a term and condition 
of employment, the District cannot act unilaterally but must 
subject its actions to negotiation with UFT. The implication 
of this analysis is that the District's unilaterally 
established bylaws could be. and were, changed by agreement 
between it and UFT. 
In essence, Greenberg's exceptions argue that it was 
discriminatory for the District to permit employees who were 
UFT trainees to act as regular, compensated representatives in 
105A hearings without permitting other District employees to do 
so. Greenberg also complains that he was denied a hearing. 
We find that the procedures followed by the hearing 
officer were correct and we affirm her decision. No hearing 
was required as the case presents no question of fact. 
The representation of unit employees at 105A hearings is a 
term and condition of employment. UFT (Barnett). 14 PERB ir3017 
(1981). As such, UFT and the District may agree to restrict 
employee representation at such hearings to representatives of 
UFT only or to permit such representation by outsiders on any 
basis that does not deny unit employees their right to fair 
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representation at such hearings.— 
Notwithstanding the District's unilaterally promulgated 
bylaw, it is apparent that UFT and the District have agreed 
upon different ground rules. UFT's agreement can be inferred 
from the fact that it is paying its trainees for their work as 
105A representatives. The District's agreement can be inferred 
from the fact that it has permitted the new practice. 
The hearing officer correctly concluded that the new 
ground rules do not deny to unit employees their right to fair 
representation in 105A hearings. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 13. 1983 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. Rand 
2/Compare Randolph Central School District. 10 PERB ir3073 
(1977) and New York City Board of Education (NEA). 11 PERB 
1f4579 (1978). aff'd 12 PERB 1f3042 (1979). 
